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DR. BONHAM'S CASE AND THE MODERN SIGNIFICANCE
OF LORD COKE'S INFLUENCE
GEORGE P. SMITH, ]I-
Cognizant of the significant, yet comparatively short-lived, con-
tribution which Lord Edward Coke made to the English society of
his day and to the inadvertent, as well as permanent, effect that his
theory of fundamental law and judicial review had upon the American
revolutionaries and the framers of the Constitution, the scope of this
article has been limited primarily to a critical examination of the
raison d'&tre of the noted Dr. Bonham's Case-or, that case which
structured Coke's entire argument for the supremacy of the fundamen-
tal law as ensured by judicial review. It is hoped that some idea may
be gleaned of the development which the general concepts of judicial
review and fundamental law assumed in their original historical-legal
perspective and an appreciation developed of their continuing effect
in current legal thought.
I.
Edward Coke-lawyer extraordinaire, eminent judge, legal father
of judicial review, truly remarkable Parliamentary leader, and in-
ferentially, yet at times wistfully, regarded by some historians as the
defender of the basic fundamental rights of seventeenth century
Englishmen'-was born in 1549 and lived to the age of eighty-six
years.2 His lifetime spanned an extremely critical period in English
history-for it was a period in which the medieval world was being
completely transformed into another new and highly complex world.
A world where the influences of the Renaissance, the Reformation,
the commercialization of land, the agrarian revolution, the economic
* Instructor in Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.S., Indiana Univer-
sity, 1961, J.D., 1964. The author wishes to express his gratitude to professor W.
Howard Mann of the Indiana University School of Law for reading the original draft
of this article and for his valuable suggestions and criticisms. Any errors which might
have resulted in the article are those of the author.
'See generally BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 315 passim (1957) ; THORNE,
Sm EDWARD COKE 1552-1952, at 4-8 (1957); WORMUTH, THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 163 passim (1949); Boudin, Lord Coke and the American
Doctrine of Judicial Power, 6 N.Y.U.L. REv. 223, 233-36 (1929); McGovney,
British Origin of Judicial Review of Legislation, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 1-3 (1944);
McKay, Coke-Parliamentary Sovereignty or the Supremacy of the Law? 22 MicH.
L. REv. 215-47 (1923); Wagner, Coke and the Rise of Economic Liberalism, Ecox.
HIST. REv. 30 (1935).2lbid.
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effects of the dissolution of the monasteries, the power struggle be-
tween the supremacy of the Crown and the supremacy of the law, the
steady rise of mercantilism, the incipient struggle for economic liberal-
ism, and the rise of the gentry were being brought into a new focus.'
Unfortunately, no one unified pattern evolved from this heterogenous
grouping. Instead, a societal potpourri was the rather temporary,
yet in the same respect long-lasting, result of it all.
Coke, as an individual personality, was hard, arrogant, and ex-
tremely ambitious. His raucous and ruthless personality traits as
Queen Elizabeth's attorney general-which were displayed with great
vehemence in the prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh-were, how-
ever, completely discarded when he subsequently ascended the Bench.
"Coke, while Attorney General, was liable to the severest censure;
he unscrupulously stretched the prerogative of the Crown, showing
himself for the time utterly regardless of public liberty; he perverted
the criminal law to the oppression of many individuals; and the
arrogance of his demeanor to all mankind is unparalleled."4 None-
theless, the most offensive of attorney generals later became the
Honourable Judge Edward Coke, the most admired and venerated
judge of his day.' Lord Coke had a keen perceptive memory, when
he wished to exercise it. Although his court pleadings were concise,
his oratorical declamations were often brutal and his scholarly writings
tended generally to be diffuse."
Despite his many character weaknesses, Coke was a devoted family
man, at least for a brief time during his life. His first wife, Bridget
Paston, whom he greatly loved, gave him seven sons and three daugh-
ters and subsequently died June 27, 1598.1 Within five months after
Bridget's passing, however, Lady Hatton-who was also courted be-
fore her marriage by Francis Bacon-became Lord Coke's second
wife. Although two daughters were produced from their union, Lady
Hatton, who, incidentally, never took the name of Coke, was con-
stantly at odds with her husband and they were frequently separated.
Upon his death she wrote, "We shall never see his like again, praise
be to God."'
' GALPIN, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND 184-89, 243-70 (1938); HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES
AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LAW 179 (1925) ; THORNE, Op. Cit. supra note 1, at 4-7;
Wagner, supra note 1, at 30-44.
'1 CAMPBELL, THE LIVEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 275 (1873).
' BOWEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 291.
'6 FOSS,THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 108, 110, 125 (1857).
'JAMES, CHIEF JUSTICE CoKE: His FAMILY AND DESCENDANTS 10-13 (1929).
' THORNE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 4.
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Lord Coke was neat but not overly meticulous as to his appearance.
He is reported to have once said that "The cleanness of a man's
clothes ought to put him in mind of keeping all clean within."9 For
three things he said he would give God solemn thanks: "That he
never gave his body to physic, nor his heart to cruelty, nor his hand
to corruption."'
Queen Elizabeth I chose Edward Coke as her solicitor-general in
1592, and as her attorney general in 1594. James I knighted Coke in
1603 and in 1606 appointed him Chief Justice of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas. In 1613, Coke was raised to the position of Chief Justice
of the King's Bench and sworn in as a member of the Privy Council.
After his dismissal from the Bench in 1616, Coke went on to dis-
tinguish himself in Parliament where, in 1628, he presented and
sponsored the now famous Petition of Right."
II.
Voltaire once said that if man did not like his present laws, he
should quickly proceed to destroy them and subsequently make new
ones to his better liking. 2 Lord Coke, however, felt that the law
could not be made overnight. Instead, it must grow slowly and evolve
from ancient roots.'
3
110 GENERAL BIOGRAPHICAL DIcTiONALY 11 (Chalmers ed. 1813).
" 1 SEWARD, ANECDOTES oF DISTINGusHED PERSONS 242 (1804).
See generally MONTAGUE, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1603-1660, at 75(1807); MACKINNON, THE MURDER IN THE TEMPLE 120-90 (1935); 10 GENERAL
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 1-14 (Chalmers ed. 1813) ; Foss, op. cit. supra note 6, at
110-21.
" BOWEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 291.
" 1 COKE ON LITLErON 9-10 (Thomas ed. 1827), lists the "ancient roots" of law
as being:
1. Lex coronae, the law of the crowne. 2. Lex et cons-eto parliamenti. Ista leax
est ab onnibus quaerendo, a liultis ignorata, a paucis cognita. c. Lex taturae,
the law of nature. 4. Communis Lex Angliae, the common law of England,
sometimes called leax terrae.... 5. Statute law. Lawes established by authority
of parliament. 6. Consuetudines, customes reasonable. 7. Jus belli, the law of
arms, war, and chivalrie.... 8. Ecclesiastical or cannon law in courts in certain
cases. 9. Civil law in certaine cases not only in courts ecclesiastical, but in the
courts of the constable and marshall, and of the admiraltie, in which court of the
admiraltie is observed la ley Olyron.... 10. Lex forsetae, forest law. 11. The law
of marque or reprisal. 12. Lex inercatoria, merchant etc. 13. The lawes and
customes of the isle of Jersey, Guernsey and Man. 14. The law and privilege of
the Stannaries. 15. The lawes of the east, west, and middle Marches, which are
now abrogated.
In the case of Rowles v. Mason, 2 Brownslow & Goldesborough 198, 123 Eng. Rep.
829 & 892 (C.B. 1612), Coke endeavored to qualify and thereby delineate the three
primary parts of the Law when he said:
... all agree that the law consists of three parts. First, Common Law. Secondly,
Statute Law, which corrects, abridges, and explains the Common Law: The third,
Custom which takes away the Common Law: But the Common Law corrects,
allows, and disallows both Statute Law and Custom, for if there be repungnancy in
a statute, or unreasonableness in Custom, the Common Law disallows and rejects
it as appears by Dr. Bonham's Case....
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Coke was obviously quite aware of the fact, as Dean Roscoe Pound
notes,'14 that while the law must be stable and unfaltering, it must
not remain completely still. While man has continually sought to
establish a permanent foundation in order that his human actions
might be structured, the ever-changing climates of the social schema
demand that frequent necessary adjustments be made.' 5 Perhaps the
only way this paradox of the law's stability and plastic flexibility
could be solved in seveententh century England and can be solved
modernly, then, was by a conscientious reinterpretation by both
judges and lawyers alike of the rich historical records of the past."'
Coke followed this line of reasoning and accordingly adopted medieval
common law-envisaged as such primarily through the Magna Charta
-to the needs of his own newly emerging society.17 The Magna
Charta was "the fountain of all the fundamental laws of the realm."" s
Unfortunately, Coke's lack of historical perspective contributed to
numerous mistakes in his decisions. Nonetheless, he is to be respected
for his firm and decisive stand on the supremacy of the law over the
supremacy of the Crown. "Non sub homine set sub Deo et lege."'0
"Reason," said Coke, "is the life of the law, nay the common
law itself is nothing else but reason."" ° Reason "is gotten by long
study, observation, and experience, and not of everyone's natural
reason; for nemo nascitus artifex."' Hence it is apparent, then, that
Lord Coke felt the law was experience itself, developed and nurtured
by reason. But, without the "mustard seed of experience," man's
own natural reason could not possibly avail as a permanent sub-
stantive body of law.
Coke espoused the idea that the Bench should function as an in-
dependent and separate entity apart from the Crown.22 It was to
be given enough power to bring both King and Parliament into line,
when the occasion so arose. The highest law of the realm-the
"POUND, LAW FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND REASON 23 (1960).
1 Ibid.
"THORNE, SIR EDWARD COKE 1552-1952, at 12, 13 (1957).
"HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LAW 140 (1925).
1 COKE, INSTrUTES 81 (1628) ; 2 COKE, INSTITUTES 57 (1642).
"The Case of Prohibitions, 12 Co. 64, 77 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1607); The Case of
Proclamations, 12 Co. 74, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (C. P. 1610) ; GOVERNMNIENT UNDER LAW
1-3, 571 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
'THORNE, op. cit. supra note 16, at 45.
2 COKE, INSTITUTES 179 (1642).
TANNER, CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE REiG OF JAMs I, A.D. 1603-
1625, at 76 (1930); TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF tHE SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURY, 1603-1689, at 387 (1937); MacKay, Coke-Parlianentary Sover-
eignty or the Supremacy of the Law? 22 MICH. L. REv. 215, 231 (1923).
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natural or fundamental law-was to be administered by the court and
was thereby to serve as a type of disciplinary gauge to the power
struggle between the sovereign and the court.2  Montague suggests
that the primary issue between the interested parties was whether
the strict and decided rules of law were to be the touchstones for
the administration of justice or whether justice was to be handled
by the courts according to the wishes of the state. In other words,
was the law or the will of the King to be supreme in England?
2
III.
The Case of the College of Physicians, commonly referred to as
Dr. Bonham's Case, is reported by Coke as Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas,2" as well as by Brownlow, 26 who attended
the court in his official capacity of Prothonotary of the Court. These
two sources taken together enable one to reconstruct the complete
arguments of the case in considerable detail.
On April 30, 1606, Thomas Bonham, Doctor of Philosophy and
Physics, graduate of Cambridge University, was cited to before the
president and censors of the Royal College of Physicians of London
on a charge of practicing medicine in London without obtaining a
proper certificate to practice from the Royal College. Dr. Bonham
was fined one hundred shillings for his failure to obtain the certificate
and was further forbidden-under pain of imprisonment-to practice,
until he was first properly admitted by the College. Bonham, being
a strong-willed individual continued to practice, however, and was
later recalled by the College to answer for his misdeeds. On this
occasion he defaulted, and in his absence was consequently fined the
sum of ten pounds. Within several months, Bonham appeared once
again before the College and not only arrogantly refused to pay his
fine, but also to refrain from the further practice of medicine. He
took the position that since he was a Doctor of Medicine of the
University of Cambridge, the Royal College of Physicians had no
jurisdiction whatsoever over him. Because of this stand, Dr. Bonham
was imprisoned for seven days.27
' McGovney, The British Origh of Judicial Review of Legislation, 93 U. PA.
L. Rm I passim (1944).
- MONTAGUE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1603-1660, at 75 (1807).
'8 Co. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610).
'2 Brownl. 255, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C. P. 1610).
' S Co. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C.P. 1610). See generally, Plucknett, Bonham's
Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REv. 30 passim (1962); BowEN, THE LI ON
AND THE THRONE 315 passim (1957).
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This case, then, as it was brought before Mr. Justice Coke, was an
action for false imprisonment by Bonham against Henry Atkins,
George Turner, Thomas Moundford, and John Argent, doctors in
physics, and John Taylor and William Bowden, yeomen-leading
members of the Royal College of Physicians. The defendants pleaded
the letters patent dated 10 Henry VIII, which gave them the powers
as a College to impose fines on practitioners in London who had not
been duly admitted to practice medicine by them. They further
claimed the right, under the letters, to govern all physicians in London
and impose fines and imprisonment, if necessary, upon them for
infractions thereof. 2s
The letters patent were later confirmed by statute.2 9 Therefore,
the statute under consideration by the court in this case was negative
-or one which superseded and defeated the common law. Nonethe-
less, the words of patent were clear and unambiguous-no one was
to be allowed to practice medicine in London without first being
admitted by the letters of the president and the College. Coke, him-
self, said, "Every statute consisteth of the letter and the Meaning,""0
and accordingly, "every statute ought to be expounded according to
the intent of them that made it."31 But, even though the intent of
the framers was obviously clear, Justice Coke could not allow their
intent to be recognized.
While one provision of the College's patent given it by the Act of
14 Henry VIII supposedly held that medical graduates of the Univer-
sities of Cambridge and Oxford were to be permitted to practice their
profession outside the seven-mile circuit of the City of London without
being first examined by the Royal College, the authenticity and ap-
plicability of this provision were not even discussed by Coke.2 In-
stead, he undertook an exhaustive consideration of the original letters
patent of the Royal College.
The first clause of the letters patent, as noted previously, stated
in essence that no one was to be allowed to practice medicine within
the City of London until he was properly admitted to the practice
by the College of Physicians and that a fine of one hundred shillings
would be imposed upon an unlicensed physician for each month he
so practiced, yet the second clause provided that the College was to
'8 Co. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (C. P. 1610).
14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1523) ; 1 Mary, 2d Sess. c. 9 (1553).
4 COKE, INSTITUTES 324 (1944).
Id. at 330.
8 Co. 114a, 116a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 649-50 (C. P. 1610).
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have the general supervisory and disciplinary powers to govern all
physicians of the city-including the foreign physicians practicing
there. 3 Chief Justice Coke considered the two most basic points as
regards the letters patent, from which all others stemmed and were
ultimately decided, as being whether the censors of the College had
power to fine and imprison Dr. Bonham and, admitting they had the
power if they had correctly and properly executed it.34 Before he
plunged into the holding and its defense, Coke could not restrain
himself from briefly commenting-and by so doing setting the tenor
of his final decision-on the timely and very controversial question
of whether the graduates of the Universities of Cambridge and Oxford
were, generally, under the jurisdiction of a private college. He firmly
stated that there could be no comparison made between a private
college and the two great universities-just as no comparison could
be made between a father and his child, or between a fountain and
its meandering streams and tributaries.3 5 "The university is alma
mater, from whose breasts those of that private college have sucked
all their science and knowledge.., the university is the fountain, and
that and the like private colleges are tanquam rivuli, which flow from
the fountain."3
Coke put forth five arguments in support of his holding that the
censors and president of the Royal College of Physicians did not
possess the powers they claimed to fine or imprison a competent yet
unlicensed physician, as opposed to a physician malpracticing, and
that therefore the College had not properly exercised their general
powers. 7 The first argument was that the first and second clauses
of the letters were distinct and parallel. Therefore, the definite penalty
of the first clause did not attach, and imprisonment was not properly
imposed on an unlicensed physician. Second, since the body of a man
was greatly harmed by a physician's malpractice, it was but reasonable
that the offending physician should himself receive punishment by
having his body incarcerated. But, when a physician endeavored to
practice his profession in a proper manner in London-without first
obtaining a license from the Royal College-and no harm thereby
came to his patients, that physician was not to be imprisoned. Third,
while the time interval in the first clause of the letters was fixed as a
month, so that no charge under it could be so brought until a month
' Id. at 117a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 651. 3'Ibid.
" Id. at 116b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 650. Id. at 117a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 651.
SIbid. Id. at 117b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 651-52.
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elapsed, the second clause had no fixed stated time, and therefore the
first and second clauses were distinct." Fourth, since the Royal Col-
lege of Physicians was to receive one-half of all the fines, the members
of the College were in fact not only judges but also actual parties to
any cause of action before them. And here, by way of reinforcing
dicta, Coke uttered what many believe to be the most controversial
judicial dictum of his life."' "The censors cannot be judges, ministers,
and parties; judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make
summons; and parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture .... [t]he
common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge
them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed,
the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.""
The fifth and final argument which Coke made in support of his
holding was that no one should be punished twice for the same of-
fense. 2 In effect, this is the result which would have occurred if the
two clauses in the original letters patent were not held to be distinct-
for an unlicensed physician would not only have been liable to a fine
of one hundred shillings, after he had practiced without a license for
a month, but under the second clause of the letters, he would also
have been subject to a fine as well as imprisonment. Therefore,
Justice Coke reasoned that the second clause had to be understood
as applying only to improper practice or malpractice, rather than to
both unlicensed and improper practice. 3
Sir Frederick Pollock stated that there were no cases which one
could find where the English court, by an independent act of their
own, either overruled or disregarded the plain meaning of an act of
Parliament.44 But, what of the holding in the Bonham case? Did
Pollock inadvertently overlook it in his writings? First of all, it is
well to recognize that Dr. Bonham's Case did not involve a general
law enacted by Parliament in its legislative capacity-but rather, the
case centered around a grant made by King Henry VIII which was
subsequently confirmed by Parliament. By its very implication, a
grant either limits and restricts or entirely gives away the rights and
Id. at 117b-118a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652.
40 BOWEN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 315; Thorne, Dr. Bonham's Case, 54 L. Q. Rm,.
543 (1938).
' 8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C. P. 1610) (Emphasis added).
1'
21d. at 118b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 654.3 bid.
"POLLOCK, FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDExCE 264 (3rd ed. 1911); Plucknett, Bonhan's
Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARv. L. REv. 30 (1926).
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liberties of the community. Here, King Henry's grant not only did
this, but also had the additional feature of embodying certain obvious
characteristics of a monopoly in the Royal College. Conversely, legis-
lative acts may generally be thought of as acts which express self-
government and which are technically initiated by the people through
their representatives.
Lord Coke was definitely opposed to the exercise and use of monopo-
listic powers in the realm." In his Second Institute, at article twenty-
nine, he observed that "no freeman shall be... deprived of his free-
hold or liberties, or free customs... but by the lawful judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land." Coke, then, felt that all monopo-
lies were against the Magna Charta. This was so because monopolies
were against the liberty and freedom of the individual as guaranteed
by the Magna Charta.4 6 So, it was natural that Coke-not being a
quiet, docile "lion under the throne" 4 -struck out with great vigor
at the monopoly created by the Royal College of Physicians' patent.
Nowhere in Coke's opinion did he unequivocally state that the act,
under which the cause was brought, was invalid or void.4 1 It was
not said by the court that the act was impossible to apply. Instead,
it was held to be impertinent-which inferentially seems to make
out a strong case for impossibility of a rather superficial nature.49
Since the official court reporter merely speaks of an opinion given
by the court, there is considerable reason, therefore, to question
whether a final judgment on the case was actually rendered." Hence,
Pollock was apparently correct-at least in respect to Dr. Bonham's
Case-when he stated that he could find no cases where an English
court completely and without doubt held an act of Parliament void.
While a cursory yet overcritical reading of the case might lead one
to conclude that Coke was not merely making an argument directed
against the validity of the letters patent in their statutory form, but
"W agner, Coke and the Rise of Economic Liberalism, 6 EcoN. HisT. REv. 30-40
(1935).
McKECH ME, THE MAGNA CHARTA 384 (2d ed. 1914). It is generally felt that
Coke greatly e-tended the use of the word liberties. Whatever the word mav possibly
have meant in the seventeenth century, when it was used in the Magna Charta, it
referred to a strictly limited type of liberty and probably referred to nothing more
than specific immunities and privileges of various sorts.
"James I said that though the Judges of the realm should be lions, "they should
be lions under the throne, being circumspect that they do not check or oppose any
oints of sovereignty." DicEY, INTRODUCTION To THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
ONSTITUTION 366 (8th ed. 1926).
' S Co. 108a & 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 & 646 (C. P. 1610) ; Boudin, Lord Coke
and the American Doctrine of Judicial Power, 6 N.Y.U.L. REv. 223, 244 (1929)
Plucknett, supra note 44, at 35-43.
" Plucknett, supra note 44. r0 Id. at 39.
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rather for a particular construction that he was placing upon them,51
a careful and thorough consideration of the case-set in its historical,
economic, and social perspective-allows one to comprehend the com-
plete, yet simple significance of the holding. Coke, who was imbued
with a missionary zeal as regards the ultimate fulfillment of the Magna
Charta, was, in his holding in the Bonham case, merely continuing
in his effort to enforce a rule of higher law-the wellspring of demo-
cracy, the Magna Charta, the natural law-which was binding on
Parliament as well as the courts of law.52
IV.
Now, let us direct our efforts to a critical analysis of the "precedents"
which supposedly supported the famous dictum in the fourth argument
which Coke made in the Bonham case.
"[W] hen an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason,
or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will
controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void."53 In support of this
argument, Coke cited Thomas Tregor's case where Justice Herle said:
"some statutes are made against law and right, which those who made
them perceiving, would not put them into execution .... 11 4 Coke,
however, added the above underscored words when he used this quote
and thereby sought to offer it as proof of the judges' general power
to disregard the statutes which were against the fundamental or com-
mon law. By this insertion, however, Coke completely transformed
the obviously clear and simple statement of Herle's opinion into a
vague, unrelated group of words which prove practically nothing.
There can be little, if indeed any, relation between the opinions held
by the Bench and those wishes and opinions which legislators often
entertain subsequent to passage of their bills. Legislative intent is
generally held to be expressed in legislation itself.5
The second source which Coke relied upon for favorable support
of his argument was an anonymous case printed by one Fitzherbert,
' Boudin, supra note 48, at 244.
Corwin, The Higher Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HIARv.
L. REv. 365, 372 (1929) ; MacKay, Coke-Parliamentary Sovereignty or the Supren-
acy of the Law? 22 MicH L. Ry. 215, 230 (1924).
8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C. P. 1610).
'Y. B. Pasch., 8 Ed. 3, 30 (1596).
8 Co. 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 652 (C. P. 1610). See generally MCIcLwAxIN, THE HIGH
COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SuPREAAcy 286 (1910) ; MacKay, supra note 52, at
234; Plucknett, supra note 44, at 31.
Mr. Justice Herle's words, by themselves, are taken to mean that legislators often
repent of their hasty, ill-conceived pieces of legislative drafting and allow them to
become merely "dead letters."
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from an unedited yearbook and referred to as Cessavit 42.16 In this
case, a statute" on the books authorized lords (as well as the lords'
heirs) to recover their tenements from those tenants who failed to
perform fealty service and rents on the tenement for a two-year
period. The lord of the tenement in question died and his heir subse-
quently brought a writ of cessavit against the delinquent tenant. The
writ was denied on the grounds that, under the common law arrearages
and damages did not belong to the heir, and that to allow the writ to
issue would further "be against common right and reason," and "the
common law adjudges the said Act of Parliament as to that point
void."r58 The court went on to observe that if the writ had been
brought while the lord was living the tenant would have an opportunity
to render the arrearages and the damages before final judgment and
thereby be allowed to keep his tenement.
Coke evidently felt that this case stood for the common sense
proposition that one should not be allowed to acquire rights in a res
that did not belong to him and that another should not be unjustly
deprived of his tenement without a proper remedy. The case really
seemed to be one merely of strict statutory construction by which
the question raised in the case was held to be outside the scope of
the statute. The complete statute was not invalidated, however, but
only that part which was considered.
Next, Coke relied on an annuity case which was tried during the
twenty-seventh year of Henry VIII and involved an interpretation
as well as application of the Statute De Asportatis Religiosorum of
35 Edward I. This statute in Annuity 41, as the case is commonly
called, directed that the common seal of the order of the Cistercians
and Augustines be kept by the prior and four others, yet left for
safekeeping with the prior's superior, the abbot. All deeds had to be
sealed with the common seal, and those which were not so sealed were
held to be void. "9 The case arose under a claim against the abbot that
a grant was made by the abbot's predecessor and sealed with the official
common seal, which had not been held in custody by the prior, and
therefore the grant itself was to be held void. The court, however, held
that the document in question was valid-regardless of the provisions
set forth in the statute. This position was taken because the court rea-
r8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 653 (C. P. 1610).
Statute of Westminster, 1285, 13 Ed. 1, ch. 21.
8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 653 (C. P. 1610).
"Ibid.
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soned that if the seal had been kept in the prior's possession, the abbot,
who was the superior ranking member and leader of the religious com-
munity, would not have been allowed to sign all official documents and,
conversely, if the abbot kept the seal, the prior would not have been ful-
filling his duties imposed by statute. Hence, because of the impossibility
of performance, that portion of the statute pertaining to the seal was
held void and of no effect. The impossibility referred to in this case
seemed to be developed more as a legal fiction by the judges themselves
rather than being a legal impossibility grounded in hard principles of
the law. Indeed, McIlwan points out" that other than a form of dia-
lectical impossibility, which is often created to avoid statutory require-
ments on the grounds of "public policy," there was no impossibility
of performance in the case of Annuity 41.
Strowd's case6 is the final precedent Coke used in support of his
argument that the Bench had power to declare acts of Parliament
void when they went against decided principles of fundamental law. 1 2
With the suppression of the religious houses and chauntries during
the time of the Reformation, and the extensive overturning of the
legal land titles which belonged to the religious orders, a grave situa-
tion consequently developed as a result of this action. Not only did
many of the ecclesiastical lands support their owners, but the lands
had further been subjected to a wide variety of rent charges which
were payable to laymen who had no connection with the church. In
order to allow these laymen to maintain their incomes, even though
the lands upon which the incomes had been secured were confiscated
by the Crown, the statute of 1 Edward 6, chapter 14, 1547, provided
that the rents were to be saved to all effected laymen. Regardless
of the King's seisin and that of his patentee, if any, the rents of the
class were still to be paid not only by the King himself, but all those
who acquired title from him. Yet, since some of the lands were
encumbered with rent service, or that service due a lord from his tenant
because of their feudal relationship, this was not a mere charge but a
service which the feudal lord could exact by a distress action. So,
when land burdened with rent service was taken by the King a problem
resulted, chiefly because the King's prerogative allowed him to refuse
to render such services to any ordinary man. Because of this preroga-
tive, then, the rent services were extinguished. Since the statute of 1
' MCILWAIN, op. cit. su fra note 55, at 273.
1 And. 45, 123 Eng. Rep. 345 (C. P. 1575).
' 8 Co. 114a, l18b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C. P. 1610).
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Edward 6, chapter 14, 1547, contained a clause saving all peoples'
rights to rents, even including rent services, accordingly due from
chauntry land, a serious conflict arose.63
The Strowd case, then, sought a remedy to end the confusion of the
day by holding:
If a man has lands which were once parcel of the possessions of a
chantry, and which came to the King under the Statute of Dissolution
at the time of the dissolution, and were formerly held of someone else
by rent and fealty [i.e., by rent service] or by service which is chivalry,
the King's patentee shall now hold the tenements according to the patent
[i.e., of the King] and not of the former lord and his heirs, and by the
services by which they were anciently held, save that the same rent that
was formerly rent service, he shall pay as a rent charge distrainable of
common right only by the said person who was formerly lord and his
heirs. And thus was the saving in the said statute expounded by the
Justices of the Common Bench. 4
The most interesting feature of this holding is that while the rent
services were still maintained, the court maintained them as such
under the technical term of rent charge. It is also to be recognized
that Coke's theory of the omnipotence of the common law was not
discussed by the learned judges. Nevertheless, when Coke seized upon
the case, he proceeded to "touch it up" and amplify its significance
by stating:
So the statute of I E. 6 c. 14 gives chauntries, &c. to the King, saving
to the donor, &c. all such rents, services, &c. and the common law con-
trouls it, and adjudges it void as to services, and the donor shall have
the rent, as a rentseck, distrainable of common right, for it would be
against common right and reason that the King should hold of any, or
do service to any of his subjects, 14 Eliz. Dyer 313. and so it was
adjudged in... Strowd's case.65
Coke made it appear in his report that the court held the statute in
question void on the grounds of absurdity and impossibility.
Turning now to a recapitulation of the four cases which Coke used
in his fourth argument, one clearly sees that even though Tregor's
" Plucknett, supra note 44, at 42; MacKay, supra note 52, at 224. Strowd's case
is an exceptional case and apparently has no actual question of common law involved
within it.
": I And. 45, 123 Eng. Rep. 345 (C. P. 1575). Coke also mentions by inference,
8 Co. llSb, 77 Eng. Rep. 654 (C. P. 1610), but does not comment upon, an Anonymous
case. 3 Dyer 313a, 73 Eng. Rep. 709 (K. B. 1572). The decision held by the Court
there was basically to the same effect as that of Strowd's case-namely, that the Act
of I Ed. 6, ch. 14, was to be enforced.
' 8 Co. 114a, l18b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 654 (C. P. 1610).
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case proves little, if anything, Cessavit 42, on the contrary, is clearly
a strong precedent for Coke's basic argument. The case of Annuity 41
is of little import because of the extreme arbitrariness of the Bench
in basing their decision on legal impossibility of performance. And,
finally, Strowd's case offers no reinforcing foundation for Coke's basic
premise." Lord Coke's position that Bonham's imprisonment had
been illegal does not seem to have been strengthened by the fourth
argument. It is well to remember that this fourth argument embodied
one, if not the most, basic idea which Coke espoused-namely, that
the Bench stood above all other bodies as the protector and enforcer
of the fundamental law-and that, therefore, because of his great
fervor for its preservation, he often would push it forward in an
opinion or holding which had no apparent connection with the main
line of the argument itself.6"
"Of the power and jurisdiction of the Parliament for making of
laws in proceeding by Bill," said Sir Edward Coke, "it is so transcend-
ent and absolute, as it cannot be confined either for causes or persons
within any bounds. Of this Court it is truly said: Si antiquitatem
spectes, est vetustissima, si dignitatem est honoratissima, si jurisdic-
tionem, est capacissima. '68 How could Coke have possibly made this
statement in light of his holding, and particularly his fourth argument,
in Dr. Bonham's Case? Blackstone used this very same quoted pas-
sage, a century later, to express the notion of Parliamentary sov-
ereignty.69 It is indeed very doubtful, however, that Coke attached
the same significance to his work as Blackstone did. Coke classified
Parliament as a court rather than a legislature. Not once did he
recognize the antithesis between adjudication and legislation as cur-
rent writers have so interpreted him. 0 The acts which Parliament
Plucknett, supra note 44, at 43.
See note 13 supra for a discussion of Rowles v. Mason wherein Coke enumerated
the three primary parts of the law.
4 COKE, INSTITUTES 39 (1644). De Lolme stated that, "Parliament can do every-
thing but make a woman a man, and a man a woman." JENNINGS, PARLIAMENT 2 (2d
ed. 1957).
The purposes which Coke assigned to Parliament were :--"Daughters and heirs
apparent ... may by act of Parliament inherit during the life of the ancestor. It may
adjudge an infant or minor of full age. To attaint a man of treason after death. [To
attaint a man during life was too ordinary a manifestation of Parliamentary authority
to deserve, in Coke's estimate, special mention.] To naturalize a mere alien, and make
him a subject born. It may bastard a child who by law is legitimate, the father being
a proved adulterer. To legitimize one that is illegitimate...." 4 COKE, INSTITUTES
36 (1644).
1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 160. The parliamentary supremacy concept is
discussed in MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY
378 (1910).
' MCILWAIN, supra note 69, at 148.
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enacted were analogous, so Lord Coke felt, to judgments handed
down by a court. Therefore, considered as such, they were not
regarded as rules of an inviolable nature made by an omnipotent
legislature. Instead, they were considered as judgments of another
court-which could always be disregarded if they contravened the
fundamental law. 71
So it was that Parliament was supreme only so long as it stayed
within the purviews of the common law.72 Nonetheless, it was Lord
Coke's avowed intention to make Parliament the judicial body of
prominence that it had been in the fourteenth century. As such, it
was to be the highest court in the realm and stand above the "council-
made" courts of equity, and at the very apex of the common law. 73
The modern use of the word, "supreme," differs greatly from its
use during Lord Coke's time-particularly so in reference to Parlia-
ment as a Supreme Body. In England, supreme never meant "of
an unlimited nature," regardless of whether it was being applied to
a court or a king. Rather, it implied the absence of a superior and
not the seemingly unfettered discretion which the idea of "legislative
supremacy" unquestionably conveys.74 Too, when Coke spoke of the
"transcendent power and jurisdiction" of Parliament, he was not
referring to law-making activities as one would today under modern
standards. Instead, he was referring to a type of equity jurisdiction
exercised by Parliament.7 5
V.
In light of the consideration of the above points, the answer to
the rhetorical question of whether Coke's view regarding the suprem-
acy of Parliament was in direct conflict and inconsistent with his
'HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LAW 41 (1925).
"DicEy, INTRODUCTION TO THE STa'D OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 37-38(1926), states that modernly the principle of parliamentary sovereignty merely
means that Parliament--consisting of the King (Queen), the House of Lords, and
the House of Commons-under the English Constitution has the right to make or
unmake any law whatever. Further, "no person or body is so recognized by the law
of England as having the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parlia-
ment." Id. at 38. See Dicta, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC
OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 37-176 (1905) for an
especially well-written exposition on parliamentary sovereignty and its origins.
Thorne, Courts of Record and Sir Edward Coke, 2 U. TORONTO L. J. 24, 48-49(1937) ; RELF, NomS OF THE DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS at xiv (1929).
Coke generally regarded the cause of Parliament and that of the law as identical.
The Magna Charta was, itself, of Parliamentary origin. "Parliament and the Com-
mon Law are the principal means to keep greatness in order and due subjection."
2 COxE, INSTITUTES 626 (1642).
,See MCILWAIN, op. cit. supra note 69, at 175-95.
'o MCILWAIN, op. cit. supra note 69, at 148.
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position in the Bonham case as regards the supremacy of the common
law must, of necessity, be in the negative.
The English Revolution of 1688 marked the technical-but not by
any means the complete or absolute-abandonment of the doctrinal
dicta of Dr. Bonham's Case." This abandonment was prompted by a
seeming realization of the utter futility of seeking a permanent and
well-structured legal system which, like practically everything else
of the age, was suffering from dramatic, and oftentimes even radical,
change. The Revolution increased immeasurably and even "glorified"
the status which Parliament enjoyed. Parliament, as the embodiment
of the national life in England, and under the surging pressures of new
democracy became, then, the representative of the whole body of
householders-and not merely of just the middle class. In the last
resort, Parliamentary sovereignty came to mean the unrestricted
power of the wage earners.77
The dicta in the fourth argument of Dr. Bonham's Case should
not be thought of as unimportant "filler" material postulated by Coke
in his decision. It served a much more important purpose-specif-
ically, that of justifying the strict construction of the statute upon
which the case was based. This construction was not, however, merely
embedded in a quagmire of statutory rules. Instead, it was couched
primarily within the structure of the principles of fundamental law.
One cannot but respect Coke's vision of a social system which
was to have as its fulcrum a supreme, fundamental law-interpreted
and enforced by the courts. His work may be thought of as the
complement of the work which the Tudor dynasty accomplished.
While the Tudors adapted the medieval institution of England to the
" Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REv. 30, 53 (1926).
Other authorities disagree with Plucknett as to the absolute abandonment date of the
dicta in the Bonwham case in England. Corwin, The Establishment of Judicial
Review, 9 MICH. L. Rav. 102, 104 (1910), states that the dicta was not completely
negated until the eighteenth century. Professor W. Howard Mann of the Indiana
University School of Law felt that not until the Septennial Acts of 1730 were the
courts unequivocably forbidden to overrule legislative enactments. Lecture by Prof.
Mann, Indiana University School of Law, March 27, 1963. WORMUTH, THE ORIGINS
OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISm 207-10 (1949), notes that the idea of the superiority
of the common law found frequent expression, after Dr. Bonham's Case, for about
150 years in England. Day v. Savadge, Hobart 85, 80 Eng. Rep. 235 (1614), and
City of London v. Wood, 12 Modern Rep. 66, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (1701), are among the
pertinent cases cited by Wormuth in support of his point.
In the case of Lee v. Bude & Tourington Junction Ry., L. R. 6 C. P. 576, 582
(1871), a categorical denial of Coke's principle was conclusively held. Mr. Justice
Willes held that since the proceedings before a court of law were judicial and not
autocratic, a court could not of its own volition make laws. Instead, a court was only
to administer the laws which Parliament made.
I DicmY, op. cit. supra note 72, at 310.
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modern needs of their society without making any significant sacrifice
to the underlying medieval ideas therein contained, Lord Coke accom-
plished the Herculean feat of restating the rules of the medieval law
in order that they might be made applicable to his own newly emerging
modern state. Further, while the Tudors successfully determined the
form of development of the English state, the course of development
of modern law itself was similarly determined by Coke."
Although Coke did not suffer from myopia, so far as historians
can tell, his extreme eagerness to disseminate or proselytize, if you
will, his idea of the supremacy of the law often led him to make
vague qualifying statements which had little, if indeed any, actual
support in the precedents which he cited. The originality of Coke's
idea of a law of nature superior to man-made law was not new. It
was both new and radical, however, that the courts of law should
be given the power and the right to enforce the superiority of the
fundamental law. Therein lies Coke's peculiar contribution to judicial
review of legislation. The dictum in Bonham's case became the single
most important source of the concept of judicial review. In due time,
with the subsequent differentiation of the legislative and the adjudica-
tive functions of Parliament, Coke's theory of Parliamentary suprem-
acy under the law was wholly merged into the notion of legislative
supremacy functioning as such within a framework of laws subject
to construction by the adjudicative process.
A committe report to the New York State Bar Association in
19157" noted that: "In short the American Revolution was a lawyers'
revolution to enforce Lord Coke's theory of the invalidity of Acts
of Parliament in derogation of the common right and of the rights
of Englishmen." These words are quite strong. Their significance is,
nonetheless, not to be understated. Unfortunately, space does not
permit a historical consideration of the entire background of the
American Revolution. Nevertheless, a few pertinent comments are
in order.
Lord Coke's theory of the supremacy of the fundamental law, while
not engrafted to or enshrined in the English common law itself, did,
however, travel the seas and find fertile ground for ready expression
in the American Colonies. When the Colonies, New England in partic-
7'HOLDSWORTH, SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF ENGLISH LAW 147 (1925).
1 New York State Bar Association Yearbook 1915, p. 238. This committee report
is severely and, in part, unduly criticized by Boudin in Lord Coke and the American
Doctrine of Judicial Power, 6 N.Y.U.L. REv. 223 (1929).
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ular, protested the Stamp Act, which Parliament passed in 1765,
James Otis shouted, "An Act against natural equity is VOID !"'  The
Massachusetts Assembly declared the Stamp Act invalid, against the
Magna Charta and the natural rights of Englishmen and therefore,
according to Lord Coke, null and void."1 James Otis also cited Coke as
authority for the Colonial nullification of the Parliamentary Acts.
82
Giddings v. Brown, a 1657 case in the Boston courts, was the very
first clear holding by which a judicial body in the Americas ruled a
legislative act, by a town meeting, invalid because of the dicta in
the Bonham case. 3 In 1875, the United States Supreme Court in
Loan Association v. Topeka84 also conclusively followed the dicta
in Bonham's case. With the passage of the Constitution of the United
States-and more particularly, article III-in 1787, Coke's concept
of judicial review was finalized and thereby given permanent recogni-
tion.8
5
Lord Coke's theory of judicial review-which arose upon the basis
of the doctrine of fundamental law-has been nurtured and reinforced
by later generations of judges, lawyers, and commentators and, to
this very day, rests on the same historical basis. Thus, the so-called
"dictum" in Dr. Bonham's Case not only foreshadowed and subse-
quently became an essential part of the power which the courts in
America modernly exercise in their voidance of statutes on the ground
of constitutional conflict, but also gave rise to the test of reasonable-
ness which is the ultimate raison d'6tre of that power.
BECKER, THE EvE OF REvOLUTION 70 (1921).
*'McGovney, The British Origin of u dicial Review of Legislation, 93 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 3-37 (1944).
1 Id. at 5.
'2 Hutchinson Papers 1-15 (Prince Soc. 1865). Winthrop v. Lechmere, (Conn.
1727), Robin v. Hardaway, Jeff. 109 (Va. 1772), Trevett v. Weeden, 10 Records of
Rhode Island 219 (1865), Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 252 (South Carolina 1792)
are all considered to be landmark cases which held according to the dicta in Dr.
Bonhain's Case.
8'87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1874).
1 RooD, THE HISTORY OF BUILDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
125-33 (1948).
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